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Subreption, Radical Institutionalism, 
and Economic Evolution 
 
Summary: This inquiry seeks to establish the importance of subreption as an
approach to economic and social evolution that also proves integral to the
tradition of radical institutionalism. We relate subreption’s etymology and ap-
pearances in Roman, Canon and Scots Law, as well as in Philosophy, to its
applications found in writings advanced by Thorstein Veblen and carried on
later as William Dugger details the rise of corporate hegemony. Understood as
an approach derivable from selected philosophical writings of Immanuel Kant, 
in social science subreption is suggested to occur through the introduction of
an outside value that sets off a form of institutional evolution that we character-
ize as an évolution noire. Considering subreption and the rise of big business, 
we can mark a movement away from a past governed by comparatively noble
values and towards a deteriorated, debased and degraded economic and so-
cial reality overtly influenced by comparatively ignoble, pecuniary values. 
Key words: Evolutionary economics, Immanuel Kant, Radical institutionalism,
Subreption, Thorstein Veblen, William Dugger. 
JEL: B15, B25, B31, B41.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In his article “An Institutional Framework of Analysis”, William Dugger (1980, p. 
901) emphasizes that “[s]ubreption is one of the least studied social phenomena of 
the twentieth century”, and that subreption can destroy “... the foundation of a plural-
istic society”. In Dugger’s view, it is through subreption that institutional autonomy 
is replaced with institutional hegemony and this is the process that he argues gives 
rise to corporate hegemony in the United States during the second half of the 20th 
century. Dugger identifies an evolutionary process that we think has led towards the 
expansion of corporate control and dominance extending well beyond the American 
nation state to include corporate hegemony over an increasingly globalized economy 
in the 21st century. 
But what is subreption? Can we clearly define its meaning and identify its 
manifestations?  
In our view, understanding subreption requires an appreciation for philosophi-
cal inquiry, as towards the end of his Inaugural Dissertation that was published in 
1770, Immanuel Kant refers to and seeks to define the meaning of what he terms as 
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vitium subreptionis metaphysicum. This Latin term can be translated as the fallacy of 
subreption and it suggests the emergence of a “metaphysical mistake”. In the English 
language the single word: subreption is typically relied upon to describe these related 
philosophical issues. 
In a Kantian view subreption involves a falsehood that, once introduced, can 
serve to distort further human reasoning. Our research suggests that Thorstein Veblen 
brought Kant’s understanding of subreption into social science inquiry, as subreption 
is relied upon as an approach integral to his book The Higher Learning in America: A 
Memorandum on the Conduct of Universities [1918]. In the view of Dugger (1980, p. 
901), Veblen’s Higher Learning should be appreciated as “... perhaps the best study 
of subreption ever written”. Over the course of the 1980s, Dugger published articles 
and a book that helped to revive Veblen’s earlier use of subreption in social science 
analysis. While Veblen concentrated on the growing influences of big business and 
some of the effects of pecuniary values on higher education at the turn of the 20th 
century, especially, Dugger extended Veblen’s thinking and concentrated his efforts 
on explaining the rise of corporate hegemony in the United States over the course of 
the postwar era. Our goal with this research is to establish that in social science in-
quiry, subreption describes a particular and unique form of institutional evolution 
that tends to be utilized by critical and radical thinkers, like Veblen and Dugger.  
In our understanding, the tradition of Original Institutional Economics (OIE) 
offers two distinguishable approaches. What we would term as the “reformist” ap-
proach is emblematic of an emphasis advanced by theorists and policy-makers - such 
as John R. Commons - and which appears based upon an interest and willingness to 
reform capitalism in order that this system might function in a way that garners 
broad-based support from a population. In contrast, what is known as “radical institu-
tionalism” advocates the creation of a new system altogether, and elements of this 
approach can be found in selected writings of Veblen and Dugger. In his article 
“Veblen’s Radical Theory of Social Evolution”, Dugger (2006) goes to some length 
to clarify the Veblenian tradition of radical institutionalism that has also powerfully 
influenced his own critical contributions to economics and social science.  
In order to advance into what seems as a hardly known and largely neglected 
subject, we divide our inquiry into three major sections. Section 1 considers the ety-
mology as well as the meanings of subreption in law and philosophy. Section 2 con-
siders how initially Veblen integrates subreption into his understanding of changes in 
higher education in two distinct eras. With Section 3 we explore how Dugger extends 
Veblen’s understanding of subreption in order to explain the rise of corporate power 
and hegemony in the United States. We conclude by suggesting that subreption 
should be recognized as an approach advanced by Veblen and Dugger, in particular, 
that helps us better understand processes that can drive institutional evolution.  
 
1. Etymology and Uses in Law and Kantian Philosophy 
 
Research of Zachary Sng (2010, pp. 78-79) indicates that subreption’s early appear-
ance and uses can be found in Roman Law “... as a judicial term describing the intro-
duction of false evidence into a legal proceeding”. This notion of “false evidence”, or 
what we shall generalize as the introduction of a “falsehood”, provides the founda-
tion for understanding subreption in all of the forms considered within this inquiry. 
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In the word “subreption” the -rep- root registers as especially noteworthy, and 
could be associated (Random House 2001, p. 1636) with the Latin substantive reptile 
and the adjective reptilis. These words offer imagery suggesting, “to creep and crawl 
along”, as certain reptiles are wont to do. The Oxford Latin Dictionary (P. G. W. 
Glare 1982, p. 1622) notes that the term repatatus translates as “the act of creeping 
or crawling”. An entry found in Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short [1879] (1958, 
p. 1573) equates the Latin adjective reptilis with “creeping”. 
Centuries later and in Canon Law, the word subreption denotes (Random 
House 2001, p. 1895) “... a concealment of the pertinent facts in a petition, as for 
dispensation or favor, that in certain cases nullifies the grant”. In Scots Law, subrep-
tion is associated with “obreption”, and with its first meaning related to: “[t]he act of 
obtaining something, as an escheat by concealing pertinent facts”. In this appearance 
the word subreption is rooted in the infinitive rapere and is associated with the in-
finitives: “to seize” and “to steal”. 
When shifting from Latin to the German language, Immanuel Kant (1959) se-
lects the term Erschleichung that, according to Eduard Muret and Daniel Sanders 
(1910, p. 845), finds its root in the infinitive schleichen, and which translates as “to 
crawl along”. The substantive Schleichung means: “crawl” or “crawling”. In standard 
German/English dictionaries, Erschleichung tends to be equated with the term sub-
reption and as the most direct translation between these two languages. Those trans-
lating from Latin and German to English also tend to rely upon the term subreption 
as the associated meaning is shared across these three languages. 
More than one hundred and twenty years before Veblen started generating 
contributions and more than two hundred years before Dugger’s articles first ap-
peared, through his philosophical writings the Enlightenment philosopher Immanuel 
Kant offered key advances with his Inaugural Dissertation that was initially present-
ed in Latin as De Mundi Sensibilis atque Intelligibilis Forma et Principis. At a later 
date his Dissertation was translated to his native tongue of German as: Von der Form 
der Sinnen - und Verstandeswelt und ihren Gründen (For Latin and German texts, 
please see Kant 1959). For this inquiry we rely upon an 1894 translation to the Eng-
lish language by William J. Eckoff, as well as a 1929 translation by John Handyside. 
The English translation of Kant’s 1770 Inaugural Dissertation appears with the title: 
On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World. 
Kant’s use of the term subreption found in his Dissertation flows from the on-
tological and epistemological frameworks that he builds. Accordingly, an introduc-
tion to these frameworks and in particular to the roles played by time and space 
prove a necessary precursor for understanding his use of subreption in Philosophy.  
In rough terms, Kant’s understanding of subreption suggests that a mistake or 
fallacy in reasoning arises as knowledge of the tangible world is applied to purely 
intellectual concepts that cannot be sensuously perceived. Kant [1770] (in William J. 
Eckoff 1894, p. 50) divides human cognition into two types, the sensuous and the 
intellectual. Sensuous knowledge depends upon properties of both the subject (the 
perceiver) and the object (the external object or thing perceived). Kant [1770] (in 
Eckoff 1894, p. 51) explains that the matter of our perceptions may be supplied by 
the object, while the form is supplied by the subject. A Kantian understanding sug-
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gests that our minds, according to certain mental predilections, apply properties to 
the objects they perceive and so these mental representations are subject to features 
of our human minds and their perceptions. Kant [1770] (in Eckoff 1894, p. 50) ex-
plains that intellectual knowledge, by contrast, is that which cannot enter the mind 
through the senses. 
Conceptions of time and space assume a particular importance in Kant’s ac-
count of sensuous knowledge. Kant [1770] (in Eckoff 1894, p. 63) writes that the 
concept of time is “prior and superior” to all our sense perceptions and even our abil-
ity to reason. Kant [1770] (in Eckoff 1894, p. 59) denies that we form our concep-
tions of time by observing processes of change and instances of simultaneity and 
then infer the existence of time. Instead Kant argues that as human beings we would 
have no mental framework for making sense of change and simultaneity, that is, if 
we did not already harbor a notion of time. In this line of reasoning, therefore, time 
must precede sense perception. By an analogous line of reasoning, Kant argues that 
our conception of space is also innate and relied upon prior to our sense perceptions. 
From these conclusions, Kant can then move to propositions about time and space 
that we find prove essential for understanding what he defines as the fallacy of sub-
reption.  
Kant [1770] (in Eckoff 1894, pp. 61-65) asserts that time and space are “not 
something objective and real”. In short, there is no reason to suppose that time and 
space have any existence outside of our human minds. Instead, time and space should 
be more correctly understood as properties of thought necessary for the mental coor-
dination of distinct objects and events. Our concepts of time and space then consti-
tute the aforementioned mental laws that our minds apply to sense perception and 
mental representations of objects. To further elaborate upon and further refine our 
basic understanding, we could then clarify that Kant’s notion of subreption can be 
understood as the fallacy arising through our applying the laws of sensuous 
knowledge - that includes his notions of time and space - to concepts that properly 
belong to the intellect and which stand outside of time and space. These would in-
clude intellectual concepts of God, Platonic forms, mathematics, and the like. In 
Kant’s understanding, when we proceed with reasoning we are prone to conflate the 
sensual with the intellectual and in this manner we introduce a “falsehood”. Then the 
problem emerges that, when we commit this fallacy of subreption by introducing a 
falsehood into our reasoning, we then arrive at spurious conclusions upon which we 
can continue adding. In this sense, the fallacy of subreption that Kant identifies takes 
our thinking astray and down a path of flawed reasoning. Kant keenly notes that:  
 
“[t]he method of all metaphysics in dealing with the sensitive and the intellec-
tual is reducible in the main to an all-important rule: of namely, perceiving ‘... 
the principles proper to sensitive apprehension from passing their boundaries 
and meddling with the intellectual’.” (Kant’s emphasis in italics as found in 
John Handyside (1929, p. 73). 
 
One type of subreption that Kant [1770] (in Eckoff 1894, p. 78) considers 
leads us to believe that any condition that would have to hold in order for us to co-
herently imagine a concept must hold if that concept is true. Kant [1770] (in Eckoff 
1894, p. 78) offers the proposition: “Whatever is, is sometime and somewhere”. In 
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other words, anything that exists must exist in time and space. When we visualize an 
object or a concept, by necessity we can only imagine its existence in time and space. 
From our inability to imagine sensuously anything existing outside of time and 
space, we erroneously conclude that anything that exists must also exist in time and 
space. This can then lead us to a spurious attachment of a sensuous predicate to an 
intellectual object. The converse of this proposition also holds true. Namely, that 
whatever is sometime and somewhere must exist. This means that it is therefore pos-
sible to apply an intellectual concept - existence, in this case - to a sensuous notion. 
In this manner what Kant identifies as the fallacy of subreption succeeds in 
leading our thinking and reasoning astray, as the fallacy resembles a different and 
true axiom of reasoning. The close resemblance between these true and false axioms 
then appears to explain why Kant and his interpreters choose the particular words: 
vitium subreptionis metaphysicum, Erschleichung, and subreption, to describe the 
fallacy he identifies, holding that a falsehood can indeed creep and crawl into our 
logical thinking - largely undetected - thereby leading us to invalid reasoning, and 
because of the closeness and similarity to valid reasoning.  
 
2. From Kant’s Philosophy to Veblen’s Social Science Inquiry 
 
Of writers whom Veblen considered in his doctoral studies in Philosophy, Immanuel 
Kant appears especially influential upon his thinking. Charles Camic and Geoffrey 
M. Hodgson (2011, p. 4) note that Veblen focused upon Kantian Philosophy in the 
research for his doctoral dissertation written under the supervision of Noah Porter at 
Yale University in the 1880s, though this document became lost. A careful reading of 
“Kant’s Critique of Judgment” appearing in the Journal of Speculative Philosophy 
(Thorstein Veblen 1884), suggests Veblen achieved a mastery over Kant’s intellectu-
al journey. So we rely upon an evidential approach (Carlo Ginzburg 1986, pp. 96-
125) and take the step and reason out; that through Veblen’s contact with Kant’s En-
lightenment thinking, he also became familiar with Kant’s understanding of subrep-
tion, and to the degree that he could undertake an engaging inquiry as is found in his 
The Higher Learning in America. In our interpretation, with this Memorandum Veb-
len integrates Kant’s notion and uses of subreption as the foundation for understand-
ing observable tendencies in higher education in Europe during the medieval era, as 
well as in the United States with the rise of big business at the turn of the 20th centu-
ry.  
Though subreption appears as the central method relied upon in his Higher 
Learning, Veblen does not clearly define his understanding of subreption and its ap-
plications in this penetrating Memorandum. To make matters even more challenging, 
in this movement from Kantian philosophy to and through Veblen’s contributions to 
social science, the meaning of subreption appears to change substantially. Whereas 
Kant relies upon the term subreption to describe a fallacy that can affect human rea-
soning, our view is that Veblen relies upon an understanding of subreption that we 
interpret suggests processes involving changes in values that may lead to observable 
changes in institutions pertinent to university curricula taking place in European and 
American societies in two distinct timeframes. 
With the publication of his seminal article: “Why Is Economics Not an Evolu-
tionary Science?” Veblen (1898) opened up Evolutionary Economics as a new field 
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for inquiry. With this 1898 article appearing in The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
and drawing from other documents as well, we can distinguish three approaches to 
economic and social evolution that can be derived from Veblen’s writings. 
The first approaches the economy and the society through a duality. This ap-
proach was further refined into a dichotomy that tends to be widely accepted as the 
cornerstone of Veblen’s evolutionary thinking. Though not fleshed out in his own 
writings, in less than twenty years after Veblen’s passing, and in his book The Theory 
of Economic Progress [1944], Clarence E. Ayres (1962) expanded and expounded at 
length upon the use of dualism and dichotomy found in Veblen and developed them 
into what is understood (William T. Waller 1982, pp. 762-763) as the “ceremonial-
technological distinction”, and that is more widely known as the “Veblenian dichot-
omy”. 
Incorporating ideas advanced by John Dewey, Ayres (1953, 1962) refers to a 
dichotomous relationship between the instrumental and ceremonial. In short, changes 
initiated as instrumental advances, which could be considered as advances in tech-
nology that involve tools and their uses in a broad sense - including their skill sets - 
bump up against the counter-weight of the ceremonial, that could be understood as 
habits of thought that may also become encoded in traditions, with both resisting 
change (Malcolm Rutherford 1981). Out of this duality and dichotomous tension be-
tween the instrumental and ceremonial, members of a society are faced with initiat-
ing and/or accepting emergent institutions and/or reforming existing institutions that 
assist society in integrating the instrumental advances. This framework and approach 
is relied upon to explain how economic and social change can indeed take place as 
institutional evolution.  
In this seminal 1898 article that opened up future inquiries into the field of 
Evolutionary Economics, as well as in The Theory of Business Enterprise [1904], 
Veblen (2005, p. 14) introduces several key ideas and processes integral to institu-
tional evolution, including the importance of what he terms a concatenation, and that 
suggests the relatedness and connectedness between and among variables. We find 
this dimension of the Veblenian tradition is congruent with and likely draws from 
ideas advanced by one of his professors at Johns Hopkins University in the early 
1880s (Robert Griffen 1998). Integral to his efforts for advancing an “Evolutionary 
Philosophy”, Charles Sanders Peirce introduced an understanding of synechism, a 
tradition in ancient Greek thought that emphasizes continuity and continuousness 
between and among variables, and that includes variables that are physical as well as 
metaphysical or psychical. This approach to reasoning can be noted by cumulative 
causation, a term that Veblen introduces and emphasizes towards the end of this 
1898 article (John Hall and Oliver Whybrow 2008). As variables both physical and 
metaphysical interact, change can then take place through a cumulative causation, 
which we think needs to be considered as a second and distinct form of institutional 
evolution that can be readily derived from Veblen’s writings.  
While Kant introduces and considers the fallacy of subreption as a philosophi-
cal challenge and even as a metaphysical mistake that can serve to undermine sound 
reasoning, Veblen takes a mostly different tack. Starting with the first sentence of his 
first book, The Theory of the Leisure Class [1899], Veblen (2007, p. 1) emphasizes 
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that “[t]he institution of a leisure class is found in its best development at the higher 
stages of the barbarian culture; as, for instance, in feudal Europe and feudal Japan”. 
Veblen’s introducing and using the term institution proves so central, not only for the 
development of ideas found in this first book, but also for his larger contributions to 
economic and social sciences. Relatedly, when he later deals with subreption, its 
meaning gets intertwined with institutions and processes of change.  
We interpret Veblen’s view of subreption found in his Higher Learning as 
suggesting a conscious or unconscious act in which a practice that appears consistent 
with a certain set of values, is introduced into an institution that does not hold these 
values. In this manner, subreption succeeds by deceptively representing the practice 
in question as consistent with values sanctioned by the institution, much like Kant’s 
understanding of a falsehood introduced into reasoning that then distorts further rea-
soning. 
In his Higher Learning Veblen divides knowledge into two types and based 
upon the intended purposes. Veblen [1918] (1993, p. 4) explains that first we need to 
consider the existence of an intrinsically valuable form of knowledge that he terms as 
esoteric knowledge and also as dispassionate scholarship. Veblen elaborates that 
esoteric knowledge is motivated by the instinct of idle curiosity and, although it may 
eventually be put to practical ends, esoteric knowledge is not necessarily and specifi-
cally pursued for arriving at practical ends.  
In contrast and as a second form of knowledge, Veblen teaches us that practi-
cal or utilitarian knowledge is motivated by the instinct of workmanship. Initially a 
need or want shaped by the other dominant institutions of the time, is identified and 
then utilitarian knowledge is pursued and gained in order to satisfy this need or want. 
In Veblen’s view, the instinct of idle curiosity and also of workmanship leads to dif-
fering advances in esoteric and utilitarian forms of knowledge.  
In the medieval period, what he designates as the “high era of barbarism in 
Europe”, Veblen asserts that the highest level of values were utilitarian. Veblen 
[1918] (1993, p. 25) writes that during this era: “[s]aint and sinner alike knew no 
higher rule than expediency...”. Because practical considerations were of the highest 
importance to Europeans during this era, their universities were oriented towards and 
reflected values furthering utilitarian knowledge. So universities needed to be depict-
ed for serving as centers disseminating practical, utilitarian knowledge. However, 
Veblen [1918] (1993, p. 26) stresses that esoteric knowledge did indeed find its way 
into Europe’s medieval universities and “…by a sophisticated subsumption under 
some ostensibly practical line of interest and inquiry”. This wording can be thought 
to clarify the process through which esoteric knowledge - in a manner analogous to a 
Kantian falsehood - deceptively entered into university curricula where only practical 
knowledge was respected. This act and phenomenon is what Veblen [1918] (1993, p. 
26) labels as subreption.  
In our reading, subreption leads to processes of change that we judge as value-
neutral, certainly in this case of the curricula of medieval universities. However, this 
value-neutral approach seems to give way and go through a qualitative transfor-
mation with the rise of big business near the start of the 20th century, and the related 
rise in importance and dominance of pecuniary values. Phrased differently, while 
 
482 John Hall, Alexander Dunlap and Joe Mitchell-Nelson 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2016, Vol. 63, Issue 4, pp. 475-492 
subreption can be seen as a value-neutral process engendering institutional evolution 
in Veblen’s understanding of the European university in the medieval era, with the 
rise in dominance of big business, Veblen offers what we perceive as a sharply criti-
cal view of the effects of pecuniary values that came to dominate in the United 
States, and not only in university curricula. In his book, The Theory of Business En-
terprise [1904], Veblen (2005) develops a poignant critique of the rise of big busi-
ness and the associated increase in importance of pecuniary values, and the problems 
these values caused in the performance of the larger industrial economy with an at-
tendant banking sector. 
Our interpretation of Veblen’s applied understanding suggests that subreption 
can be viewed as a deliberate act. In the case of tertiary education, a practice such as 
advancing and disseminating esoteric knowledge through an institution like a univer-
sity during Europe’s era of barbarism, can take place even though the institution does 
not value the genuine aim of such a practice. Researchers and educators committed 
the act of subreption by introducing and carrying on the pursuits of esoteric 
knowledge within the medieval university, all the while presenting an image that 
their academic activities advanced utilitarian purposes. This is how Veblen views 
subreption leading to institutional change and evolution. We can cite Veblen [1918] 
(1993, p. 30) noting that: 
 
“[t]he dissimulation and smuggling-in of disinterested learning has gone on ever 
more openly and at an ever increasing rate of gain; until in the end, the attention 
given to scholarship and the non-utilitarian sciences in these establishments has 
come far to exceed that given to the practical disciplines for which the several fac-
ulties were originally installed”. 
 
In Veblen’s view, the “dissimulation and smuggling-in” that seems to form the 
heart of the act of subreption, in this example, can be thought of metaphorically as 
the introduction of a falsehood in the Kantian sense, and that leads to further distor-
tions in reasoning. As we interpret Veblen’s understanding, subreption includes the 
introduction of an out-of-place value that clearly exhibits a capacity to induce chang-
es in the values that had dominated a well-established institution, like the curriculum 
of a medieval university, in this first case, and also in tertiary education in America. 
This is his second case that we shall consider below. However, we would like to of-
fer a clarification by noting that in Veblen’s use of subreption in social science, the 
introduction of an out-of-place value that alters preexisting values governing an insti-
tution should not be judged as necessarily false, per se. In short, a newly introduced 
value that will ultimately generate evolutionary effects does not need to be judged as 
either positive or negative. Rather, the content of the new value introduced registers 
as different from the overtly stated, traditional values and objectives of the institution 
under consideration.  
According to Veblen’s thinking, only in the late 19th and early 20th century has 
the pursuit of knowledge for achieving a higher-level esoteric end, rather than some 
lower-level utilitarian, practical end, been endorsed as a legitimate aim in higher ed-
ucation. Veblen [1918] (1993, p. 7) observes that learning without clear utilitarian 
motive has been publicly avowed as a worthy endeavor of civilization only “... dur-
ing the past few generations”. In addition, Veblen [1918] (1993, p. 8) warns that alt-
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hough many people, after sober thought, would rate the dispassionate acquisition of 
knowledge as a higher good, they tend to pursue lower-level goods taking form as: 
“... religious devotion, political prestige, fight capacity, gentility, pecuniary distinc-
tion, [and a] profuse consumption of goods”. So we can identify a discrepancy be-
tween the stated and realized aims of members of American society near the turn of 
the 20th century. In addition, we find this discrepancy leaves room for another ap-
pearance of subreption that Veblen’s writings seek to illuminate.  
The subreption of college and university curricula in the era characterized by 
the rise in importance of big business proves the reverse of the subreption Veblen 
describes in the era of barbarism. Back in the medieval era esoteric knowledge mas-
queraded and crept and crawled into the curriculums of schools promoting utilitarian 
knowledge. At the turn of the 20th century utilitarian knowledge that could be under-
stood as supporting professional training over critical inquiry, crept and crawled into 
the curricula of colleges and universities operating under the banner of advancing 
higher-level, esoteric knowledge.  
Veblen’s research suggests that with their founding in the United States, insti-
tutions of higher learning were characteristically four-year colleges offering bacca-
laureate degrees in liberal arts and sciences. Their curricula were often set up and 
controlled by those connected with religious groups and even clergies; for purposes 
of educating members of the younger generation with the hopes that the ethical tradi-
tions of the religious denomination would be carried on. 
However, the rise of large-scale business enterprise portended the emergence 
of a segment of society with members favorably judged for achievements according 
to pecuniary measures, and not by ecclesiastical or spiritual qualities. Veblen [1918] 
(1993, p. 46) suggests that this more recent example of subreption that emerged dur-
ing the era of big business near the turn of the 20th century, is congruent and associ-
ated with profound increases in the scale of production and the rise of the joint stock 
company. With big business dominating, pecuniary measures and pecuniary values 
began to reshape the American value structure and landscape. In this new era wealthy 
businessmen were judged successful and so were recruited to join boards of trustees 
and boards of directors governing policies at colleges and nascent universities. Once 
in governance positions, businessmen could insert their pecuniary values into the 
decision-making processes through promoting the pursuit of practical, utilitarian 
knowledge over esoteric knowledge. This end could be achieved through their found-
ing and often raising funds for programs in business management, engineering, med-
icine, and law, and attaching these new curricula to existing programs originally fo-
cused on liberal arts and sciences. In our reading of Veblen this is how college and 
university curricula were subrepted for the pursuit of utilitarian over esoteric 
knowledge.  
Our interpretation is that Veblen’s Higher Learning can be viewed as the first 
study that brings the Kantian understanding of subreption out of philosophy and into 
social science reasoning. That is, once pecuniary values emerge as dominant - like a 
Kantian falsehood - pecuniary values then generate continuous effects leading to-
wards an institutional evolution that implicated and transformed the focus of curricu-
la in higher education in America. And the gradual shifting and elevating of success 
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measured by pecuniary values, over more noble values associated with dispassionate 
scholarship, also helped to alter what had been prevailing as a commonly shared 
conventional wisdom for placing judgments on types of knowledge.  
Drawing from Veblen’s writings we have sought to explain how an out-of-
place value that we could judge similarly to a falsehood in the Kantian sense, might 
enter into an existing institution and initiate a subreption of long held values that then 
leads towards institutional evolution. But how the introduction of an initial falsehood 
inconsistent with the institution’s existing values deceptively enters into and later 
snowballs into profound institutional evolution, appears neglected in Veblen’s writ-
ings. So the subject matter has tended to remain vague and also undeveloped as an 
instrument for analysis in economic inquiry - at least until it was picked up, recon-
sidered, and further advanced in selected writings of William Dugger. 
 
3. From Veblen to Dugger’s Use of Subreption  
 
We assess the research of William Dugger as particularly important as it helped to 
foster a revival in the school of OIE and through effectively connecting Thorstein 
Veblen with his roots. After some decades of what could be considered as compla-
cent interpretations of Veblen’s thinking that led to a reformist brand of institutional-
ism, Dugger (2006) emphasized the “red threads” that could be found running 
through his writings. In addition, Dugger develops and stresses that Veblen was in-
deed influenced by and held positions congruent with socialist and anarchist move-
ments of his day. Of note is that back in 1918 and when employed by the United 
States Food Administration in its statistical division, Veblen (1932) researched out in 
the field and then formulated an opinion that was later put together by Joseph 
Dorfman and published under the title: “Using the IWW to Harvest Grain”. 
This IWW acronym refers to the “Industrial Workers of the World” and in the 
early 20th century this radical syndical was known for advancing the slogan: “One 
Big Union”. The IWW was also (and still is) known for its rebel rousers energetically 
promoting anarchism. In his opinion, Veblen made clear his appreciation for the ca-
pability of the IWW field workers, and so he encouraged that they be employed to 
assist in alleviating the shortages of agricultural labor at the harvest times during 
World War One. 
In our reading we find no evidence that Dugger connects Veblen’s understand-
ing and uses of subreption back to Kant’s thinking. However, Dugger (1980, p. 901) 
clearly and explicitly laud’s Veblen’s advances in his applied study of subreption 
found in the Higher Learning dealt with in detail above. But wholly unlike Veblen, 
Dugger makes a concerted effort to define his understanding of subreption prior to 
engaging in its applications and uses for clarifying processes driving institutional 
evolution in the United States over the course of the 20th century.  
In the view of Dugger (1980, p. 901) and when considering a definition draw-
ing from jurisprudence, “... subreption... [involves] unfair or unlawful representation 
though suppression of fraudulent concealment of facts”. In moving from a legal defi-
nition to its connections with economics and social science, Dugger (1980, p. 901) 
defines subreption as: “... the process whereby the function performed by one cluster 
of institutions becomes the means of another cluster of institutions”. We find this 
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definition fully consistent with Veblen’s understanding and uses of subreption, and 
also providing a continuation of the meaning of subreption found in the writings of 
Kant detailed and emphasized above in Section 1.  
Dugger fully credits Veblen for his seminal contributions that assist in our un-
derstanding processes of subreption attributable to institutional evolution in the cases 
of tertiary education. Then what helps to distinguish and also differentiate Dugger’s 
efforts from Veblen’s is his drawing connections between subreption and power. In 
short summary, in Dugger’s understanding subreption can function as a means for 
acquiring and further enhancing economic and societal power. This increased power 
may be achieved through inserting an out-of-place value that serves to alter and 
thereby subrept the existing values, and in this manner dominate the behaviors of 
members of society, as well as the key economic institutions linked with production 
and distribution. In a nutshell, for Dugger the road to economic and societal power is 
based upon the subreption of values that govern people and institutions.  
With the start of the 20th century subreption in higher education seems influ-
enced more by the rise of big business and a related and simultaneous shift in values 
that placed emphasis upon pecuniary measures over more traditional values - like 
decency, respectability, truthfulness, and honor - values and virtues that once sup-
ported a plurality of institutions in American life. In an evolutionary sense, this shift 
in values occurs through the rising dominance of pecuniary values as a standard for 
measure, leading to the ascent of the businessmen to governing boards, with the ori-
entations of their decisions generating changes in curricula that contribute towards 
the evolution of the institution of higher education. This was the focus of Veblen’s 
study developed in detail above in Section 2. 
For Dugger, subreption also involves the insertion of a new value or set of 
values within an institution. However, Dugger offers an added emphasis upon the 
roles of power and dominance leading to hegemony.  
In the view of Dugger (1980, p. 897), institutional structures serve as the 
sources of power; for it is within institutional structures that “... individuals learn 
motives, goals, ideals, and means from their participation in society’s institutions”. In 
an earlier timeframe in American history to which he refers, Dugger suggests that 
through an array of relatively independent institutions, such as: family, school, 
church, military, government, and business; individuals may indeed gain notions for 
expected behaviors. Carrying this line of thinking further, Dugger advances the view 
that institutional hegemony can be achieved through subrepting the values associated 
with an individual’s participating in these sorts of institutions. Of note is that an indi-
vidual’s values can change unknowingly, and with the outcome of their unknowing, 
adding support to the hegemony of one institution, in particular, what Dugger singles 
out as the business corporation that morphed into the conglomerate over the course 
of the 20th century. For subreption to occur within this context, a set of values con-
gruent with the conglomerate needs to come in disguised - as a falsehood in the 
Kantian sense - and then transform (through subreption) the values held by a portion 
of members of society that were associated with the relatively independent institu-
tions; such as small businesses, family, school, neighborhood, trade association, and 
the like.  
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While Veblen develops his case study of higher education, Dugger relies upon 
his insights into subreption as a way of explaining processes at work that can con-
tribute to a snowballing and thereby generate profound institutional change. For 
Dugger, this means nothing less than the accelerated evolution of the capitalistic sys-
tem in the United States during the 20th century; from starting out relatively decen-
tralized, to its transformation into a centralized hegemony orientated towards advanc-
ing business interests above all.  
In an effort to explain the direction of the economic evolution of United States 
capitalism, Dugger places special emphasis upon the shift in corporate management 
practices and the structure of companies. More specifically, Dugger considers the 
rise of the “M” form of corporate organization and governance (management) and its 
replacing the “U” form.  
In the view of Dugger (1988, pp. 80-91), with the rise of big business and for 
the short period leading up to the U.S. entry into World War One, relatively large 
enterprises in the United States were characteristically organized with corporate gov-
ernance centered around serving the production unit; in what is dubbed as the “U” 
form. In the decades after this monumental war, the “M” form of corporate organiza-
tion was steadily introduced and the production units came to be coordinated by a 
head office that included the corporate leadership, especially the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) as well as the finance department and its leader, the Chief Financial 
Officer (CFO). In Dugger’s view, this change in governance provides the institution-
al foundation for the shift from what we had known as the “business” or the “compa-
ny” to the “conglomerate”. With this “M” form of governance, communication with-
in the conglomerate became centralized and directives moved from the top down to 
the several or numerous production units. Dugger’s research emphasizes that after 
the second world war the “M” form of corporate organization that gave rise to the 
conglomerate run by a centralized headquarters - with the CEO and CFO exerting 
great powers in the managing and running its production units - steadily replaced 
what had been the independent business corporation focused around a single produc-
tion unit.  
Fully congruent with the notion of increasing efficiency, the spreading of the 
“M” form of corporate management generated profound effects and led the evolution 
of the U.S. economy down the road that culminates in what Dugger (1988, 1989a) 
describes as a full-blown “corporate hegemony”. In Dugger’s understanding, this 
means the small and medium-sized businesses, managed and run by individuals with 
their values supporting an array of relatively independent institutions; like the local 
church, the cub scouts, the peewee baseball league, gave way as corporate values 
were introduced that altered existing values.  
Exploring and detailing the emergence, rise, and dominance of corporate pow-
er in the United States, Dugger introduces four “instruments of hegemony” that he 
regards as integral for detailing how this power was indeed gained in the shift from 
the “U” to “M” form of governance. As instruments, Dugger (1980, p. 901) empha-
sizes the importance of “subreption” that is then followed by “contamination”, “emu-
lation”, and “mystification”. Dugger skillfully traces subreption back to Veblen and 
his Higher Learning. Eight years later and in his article “An Institutional Analysis of 
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Corporate Power”, Dugger (1988, pp. 93-101) presents what he designates as 
“invaluation processes”, and he then leaves out the term “subreption”. Our reading 
suggests that subreption can be related to all four of these invaluation processes con-
sidered.  
In this later article, Dugger (1988, pp. 93-101) introduces and elaborates the 
four invaluation processes as: “contamination”, “subordination”, “emulation”, and 
“mystification”. Published in the following year, in his book Corporate Hegemony, 
Dugger (1989a, pp. 129-151) refers to “power processes”, and lists these in a differ-
ent order as “emulation”, “contamination”, “subordination”, and “mystification”. 
Our interpretation suggests that for Dugger, subreption can take place through 
these processes, and can also take place simply; as monetary (pecuniary) values that 
emerged as dominant with the era of big business continue to spread and subrept 
many - if not most other - institutions at the core of American life. For Dugger, like 
Veblen, money can function as a measure and as a value that can then penetrate (like 
a Kantian falsehood), subrept and also alter existing values, and in this manner come 
to dominate the broader array of values that had been governing other institutions. 
This form of subreption occurs as leaders of the conglomerates increase their power 
through spreading and emphasizing the importance of pecuniary values (that also 
prove integral to increasing conglomerate revenues), giving rise to a socio-economic 
formation that Dugger dubs as corporate hegemony. 
Dugger (1989b) argues, and we agree, that when an institution and its values 
dominate a society to the exclusion of other institutions and values, citizens’ capacity 
for ethical reasoning is degraded. In pluralistic societies, individuals have to deal 
with conflicting ethical imperatives from various institutions, such as: family, school, 
church, etc. For example, a church pastor might emphasize turning the other cheek, 
while at home the father might emphasize standing fast and striking back at the 
schoolyard bully. Dugger teaches us that in an effort to balance out conflicting val-
ues, children learn at an early age to consult their own consciences, to weigh various 
values, and to navigate a murky and uneven moral path. When the value of one insti-
tution (like the pecuniary values associated with business conglomerates) subrepts 
the values of all other institutions, Dugger (1989b, p. 134) writes, the individual “is 
not forced to make choices and defend them, so she does not synthesize or recon-
struct her own values out of the competing ones she encounters. [In short,] [s]he does 
not acquire moral integrity”. 
Extending Dugger’s thinking, the rise of corporate hegemony is integrated 
with the dominance of comparatively ignoble, pecuniary values that lead us away 
from institutional pluralism. This suggests to us an évolution noire, meaning an evo-
lution towards a deteriorated, debased and degraded economic and social reality that 
is governed largely, if not exclusively, by pecuniary values that are fully congruent 
with and serve to support this hegemony.  
With Dugger, as with Veblen, and what also seems congruent with Kant’s 
thinking, one mechanism of institutional evolution takes place through the introduc-
tion of an out-of-place value that initiates processes leading towards what is broadly 
understood as institutional change. Identifying this out-of-place value depends upon 
the case under consideration. However, like a Kantian falsehood, this newly intro-
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duced value is used to misrepresent the true aim of some crucial practice. With the 
20th century characterized by the rise and historically unparalleled dominance of big 
business, the importance placed upon pecuniary values, especially related to increas-
ing corporate or conglomerate shareholder interests, is attendant. Both Veblen and 
Dugger focus their attention on the influence of the rise and dominance of business 
and its emphasis upon pecuniary values; however, with Dugger adding the im-
portance of the rise and influences of the conglomerate. So as we consider the sub-
reption of societal values at the core of institutions during the 20th century, we can 
narrow our focus to the proclivity for pecuniary values stemming from the business 
realm, spilling over and replacing what we consider as more noble values that were 
congruent with a plurality of institutions.  
In key respects Dugger follows Veblen, seeking to clarify the mechanisms that 
propel pecuniary values to dominate and initiate processes of subreption that engen-
der further evolutionary processes that lead to institutional evolution taking place 
over time. Our sense is that for the 20th and 21st centuries we can single out pecuniary 
values associated with big business, conglomerates, and multinational corporations - 
oriented towards production and also finance - as the instigators and drivers of sus-
tained subreption in the current era. Moreover, this historic shift to a narrow focus on 
pecuniary values can be described as moving away from a past governed by an array 
of comparatively noble values supporting institutional pluralism, and towards a pre-
sent and future governed by comparatively ignoble pecuniary values. This tendency 
renders relevance to our selection of the term évolution noire that suggests not only 
an evolution, but a dark evolution. 
 
4. Summary and Conclusion  
 
Kant’s writings stress that this vitium subreptionis metaphysicum that is also known 
in English as a “metaphysical mistake” and as the fallacy of subreption, suggests that 
through the dual character of an object or thing, human perception slithers and crawls 
in and corrupts processes of reasoning. Crucial to Veblen’s and Dugger’s understand-
ing is the shared notion that subreption succeeds in integrating an out-of-place value 
by first introducing a practice consistent with a pre-existing value. This practice en-
ters successfully if it is represented as consistent with values already held. Over time 
the practice gains legitimacy as standard procedure and values gradually shift to ac-
commodate it. We believe this form of subreption needs to be understood as contrib-
uting towards institutional evolution. 
More specifically for Veblen, one instance of subreption occurs when an un-
acceptable track of inquiry enters a university curriculum by purporting to be the 
dominant species of scholarly work. When utilitarian pursuits were valued during 
Europe’s era of barbarism, scholars could indulge their instinct of idle curiosity by 
finding a suitably practical pretext for their inquiries. With these points in mind, 
Dugger’s contribution can be differentiated in that his inquiry into subreption is 
largely synonymous with his efforts to explain mechanisms behind the gaining of 
power that leads towards dominance and even hegemony of one value over all others. 
In Veblen’s inquiry into higher education in the United States, power seems to be 
implicit - though grossly understated - through offering those exhibiting pecuniary 
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successes positions allowing them to further extend their power through subrepting 
college and university curricula in a direction that is congruent with their own busi-
ness interests.  
We could then characterize Veblen’s penetrating insights at the start of the 
20th century as marking the rise in importance of big business and the associated sub-
reption of more noble values by pecuniary values, and with implications for the evo-
lution of this institution of tertiary education he selects for his case study. Dugger 
picks up where Veblen left off and then considers the effects over altering values on 
a vaster scale; that involves the transformation of the American capitalistic system 
through the subreption and narrowing of a wide array of values once held by a broad 
base of society.  
In Kant, Veblen, and Dugger’s uses of subreption, we can readily identify el-
ements of deception, masquerading, and slithering in. With Kant, however, subrep-
tion is unconscious: for if we were aware of its implications, we would likely try to 
avoid it. For Veblen, scholars (or businessmen) who have intentions discordant with 
the dominant institutional values of their day must engage in subreption intentionally, 
at least at first. Then for Dugger the rise in dominance of pecuniary values associated 
with expanding business interests, may lead to specific changes made in the name of 
improvements in governance, including efficiency gains achieved by shifting from 
the “U” to the “M” form of corporate management. Once initiated under one set of 
values, like improved efficiency, a foundation is laid for the emergence of the con-
glomerate that - over time - may emphasize a singular value that steadily leads to-
wards the emergence of corporate hegemony. This resulting institutional monolith of 
corporate hegemony that Dugger singles out can be associated with a deteriorated, 
debased and degraded economic and social reality that contributes towards forms of 
globalization that may include challenges to decent wages and salaries, as well as a 
normalization of job insecurity through a “race to the bottom”; loss of national sov-
ereignty through uncontrolled flows of capital in and out of financial centers; citizens 
migrating en masse across national borders in quests for earning income that can be 
sent back home to families as desperately needed remittances; and loss of national 
and regional determination over environmental controls; to start the list. Taken sepa-
rately and together, these changes initiate what we could cite as but some of the 
forms and measures of deterioration, debasement, and degradation that may readily 
be associated with the emerging global corporate hegemony. 
The writings of Kant, Veblen, and Dugger consider subreption as some kind 
of a first step that can then be viewed as initiating subsequent effects understood as 
evolutionary. For Kant, subreption leads a thinker to a false conclusion, which may 
potentially generate many more false beliefs. Kant writes of the damage that spurious 
axioms may wreak on entire systems of knowledge. For Veblen, a confluence of 
subreptive acts may trigger institutional change that runs deeply enough to alter an 
institution’s defining values. For Dugger, a nation built upon founding institutions 
such as: family, church, school, pride in work, thrift, community service, and the 
like, may observe the decline in the importance of these institutions as pecuniary val-
ues supporting corporate hegemony emerge as dominant.  
What helps to unify the writings as these three thinkers considering subreption 
is that the introduction of one falsehood can lead to additional false beliefs and to 
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sequences of changes, even if no other logical fallacies are committed (for Kant) - or 
no further intentional deceit is enacted (for Veblen and Dugger) beyond the initial 
subreption generated through the introduction of an out-of-place value. Less so for 
Kant and more so for Veblen and Dugger, processes of institutional evolution that are 
initiated can prove sufficient to carry the effects of subreption into an institution’s 
future forms: like “for-profit” universities emerging in recent decades in the United 
States, and a variant of an excessively militarized and totalitarian capitalism that re-
mains far beyond community and democratic controls.  
In bringing this inquiry to its close, we would like to advance the idea that 
subreption should be considered as a third approach to economic and social evolution 
that can likewise be derived from Veblen’s thinking. For several decades great em-
phasis has been placed upon the dichotomous relation between the instrumental and 
ceremonial, a view rooted in the interpretation promoted by Ayres and his followers, 
in particular. A lesser level of importance has been placed upon clarifying Veblen’s 
thinking on cumulative causation. With these two, better known approaches re-
searched and elucidated, we interpret what Veblen develops as subreption as a dis-
tinct approach to economic evolution that was first introduced and established in his 
Higher Learning. However, subreption has been neglected by those seeking to carry 
on Veblen’s insights into processes of institutional evolution. With this in mind, we 
would like to emphasize our debt to William Dugger, whose research picks up on the 
importance of subreption in Veblen’s thinking. In a sense, our aspiration with this 
inquiry is not only to underline Dugger’s emphasis upon Veblen’s originality and 
creativity in social sciences, but also to clarify Dugger’s extensions that relate sub-
reption to how power can be gained, plurality diminished, and a seemingly intransi-
gent corporate hegemony formed and institutionalized. 
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